Sadoski v. Mosley (here)
is the only case I've seen where everyone involved seems morally
blameworthy - the defense lawyer, the prosecutor, the state trial
judge, and the federal trial and appellate judges. It is, as they say,
that bad. Here's what happened...
A criminal defendant was charged with attempted theft. The trial
court had the discretion to sentence the defendant as a misdemeanant or
felon. The trial court, based on what he read in the pre-sentening
report, sentenced the defendant as a misdemeanant.
Unknown to the judge, because it wasn't in the pre-sentencing
report,
was this: When the case against her was pending, the defendant was
arrested for a drug offense. If the judge had known of the defendant's
recent arrest, he would have sentenced the defendant as a felon. The
defense lawyer did not inform the judge of the recent arrest, though he
should have.
The client's recent arrest was not privileged information.
Moreover, a defense lawyer owes a duty of candor to the trial court.
This duty requires the defense lawyer to prevent the trial court from
relying on material omissions. A defense lawyer need not volunteer
information, but he must not knowingly allow the trial court to rely on
mistaken impressions and material omissions. The omission of the arrest from the pre-sentencing report was material, and the defense lawyer knew the judge would sentence the
defendant based on that material omission. The defense lawyer thus
violated his duty of candor to the court.
What did the judge do? Contrary to clearly-established state law,
the trial court re-opened the defendant's case and re-sentenced her as
a felon. It was not a close call that the judge lacked the authority
to do this. Yet he did it anyway. This was unethical.
What did the prosecutor do? The prosecutor went right along with
the judge's unethical act, never "seeking justice," but instead,
seeking a longer sentence. The prosecutor never entered into a joint
objection to the judges act, and thus violated his oath to enforce the
law.
The defendant sued the trial judge for re-opening her sentence since
the judge lacked jurisdiction over her case. Judges enjoy absolute
immunity from suit for acts undertaken within their jurisdiction. But
here, the judge did not have jurisdiction, as clearly-established state
law denied the judge jurisdiction to re-open cases where the defendant received the
benefit of mistakes like the trial court made. Thus, under established
law, the judge could be sued.
Yet the federal district court hearing the case dismissed on
absolute immunity grounds. The federal appellate court affirmed the
judgment in a very short opinion. The panel's opinion should not have
been published, as its reasoning is rather embarrassing. Here is the
panel's analysis on the absolute immunity issue (cites omitted):
Although judges usually are immune from suits for
damages based on their judicial conduct, a judge who acts “in
the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction’ ” is not entitled to absolute
immunity. Sadoski contends that Judge Mosley
acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction when he modified
her sentence to extend the term of her incarceration. We
disagree.
Judge Mosley retained subject matter jurisdiction over
Sadoski’s conviction for attempted theft after she began serving
her sentence. Under Nevada law, Judge Mosley had jurisdiction
to modify Sadoski’s sentence, even after she had
begun serving it, if the sentence was “based on mistaken
assumptions about a defendant’s criminal record which work[ed] to the
defendant’s extreme detriment.” Here, however, the mistaken assumption
on
which Judge Mosley relied did not work to Sadoski’s detriment,
but to the State’s.
Let's pause here for a
moment. Didn't the panel just recognize that the trial court only
retained jurisdiction over cases involving "mistaken
assumptions about a defendant’s criminal record which worked to the
defendant’s extreme detriment." Clearly the mistake did not work to
the defendant's detriment. And so, the judge must have acted outside
of his jurisdiction. Right? Right? Wrong:
Accordingly, as the Nevada Supreme
Court later ruled, Judge Mosley did not have jurisdiction to
extend the term of Sadoski’s incarceration. Because we are reviewing a district court’s order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), we credit Sadoski’s allegation that Judge Mosley
knew the limits of his jurisdiction when he modified
Sadoski’s sentence. But the United States Supreme Court has
stated clearly that “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity
because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously,
or was in excess of his authority . . . .” Although we assume for purposes here that Judge
Mosley acted in excess of his jurisdiction when he modified
Sadoski’s sentence to impose a longer term of incarceration,
we conclude that he did not act in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction.
Let's
pause here again. How is it that the judge did not act in clear excess
of his jurisdiction? Nevada law clearly states that a trial court
retains jurisdiction when he makes "mistaken
assumptions about a defendant’s criminal record which worked to the
defendant’s extreme detriment." Again, no such mistake was made.
It could be that there's a legal distinction between acts done merely in excess of one's jurisdiction, and acts done clearly in excess of one's jurisdiction. It seems to me that when a judge does something that state law explicitly tells him he lacks jurisdiction to do, then the judge clearly acts
in excess of his jurisdiction. Perhaps the Ninth Circuit disagrees,
though if they do, it's hard to tell from the conclusory opinion.
More likely, Sadoski v. Mosley is yet another example of foxes guarding the hen house.
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