Eighth Circuit (Subtly) Distinguishes Monell
November 04, 2005
In Lund v. Hennepin County, the civil rights plaintiff was arrested for a drunk-driving offense. At his post-arrest court hearing, the trial court ordered him released immediately, and did not require him to post bail. Because of delays in processing his paperwork, the plaintiff was released 12 hours later. He filed a substantive due process/1983 claim against the county.
Since this was an action against the county, the plaintiff had to prove two things. First, that his substantive due process rights were violated. To establish this, he has to show that the government caused something "conscience shocking" to happen to the plaintiff. Second, since he sued the county, the had to prove that a county policy or custom was the moving force behind this conscience-shocking result. In other words: The county caused this really bad thing to happen to me.
The unanimous three judge panel denied Lund relief. Tracing the case law governing unlawful detentions, the court held that a 12-hour delay in release would not ordinarily shock the conscience. So far, so good. You and I might disagree over whether this result is, in some Platonic sense, correct. Regardless, it's consistent with the case law and is therefore a proper conclusion. But the panel does take a wrong course.
Under Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., a city is liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees if the city has a "policy or custom" that was the "moving force" behind the rights violation. Got that? Three elements: (1) policy or custom; (2) moving force; (3) rights violation. The panel, however, endorsed previous efforts that de facto added a new element to Monell actions. Watch carefully:
[In a Monell action, the plaintiff must] show that the moving force behind plaintiff's detention was a county policy whose inadequacy was "both obvious and likely to result in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights" or that there was a widespread informal custom having substantially the same effect.
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Because Lund has not alleged facts sufficient to show that his due process rights were violated or that the County was deliberately indifferent to such a violation, the district court did not err by granting summary judgment.
In other words, the panel seems to be suggesting that a policy or custom that was the moving force behind a rights violation is insufficient to state a Monell claim in the Eight Circuit. Rather, the policy or custom must also be deliberately indifferent to a citizens' constitutional rights. The Eight Circuit (and, in fairness, most federal circuits) has added a new element to Section 1983/Monell claims.